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This Article reviews the history of the "battle of the forms" issue arising
when contracting parties submit conflicting terms to each other in
attempting to form a contract and how courts have resolved issues
arising from this, both under the original Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) Article 2 and the Revised Article 2. The author reviews the
economic circumstances that gave rise to the current use of standard
form contracts, such as lower transaction costs and the ability of a
company to control the terms and the discretion of its personnel. He
discusses how battle of the forms issues were resolved before Article 2 of
the UCC was adopted, using common law interpretation tools such as the
"last shot" and "mirror image" rules. The author then reviews the
motivations for implementing UCC § 2-207, and surveys the problems
that this section has created for the ability of courts to provide consistent
resolution to battle of the forms disputes given ambiguities in the code's
wording. He then reviews the Revised § 2-207, comparing the old and
new versions of the section, and discusses both how the revision may
change how courts resolve battle of the forms disputes and the problems
that still remain. The author ultimately proposes a more straightforward
solution to the battle of the forms problem that has the advantages of the
certainty provided by common law rules with the flexibility to consider
the particular circumstances of a given transaction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Keep it simple, stupid. Not an eloquent response to the classic contracts
"battle of the forms" issue. Nonetheless, it's a practical solution to a historical
dilemma. This Article explores how simply going back to the basics could
obviate the legal quagmire created by a hundred years of "battle of the forms"
decisions and commentaries.
Standard form contracts, that is, contracts with preprinted terms containing
"boilerplate" language, have been in common use in the United States since at
least the late nineteenth century.1 In 1894, the Supreme Court held that the
standard form used by Western Union in its telegraph transmission contracts
was enforceable. 2 Shortly thereafter, standard forms became the subject of
scholarly review and comment.3 Today, standard forms are estimated to
account for more than ninety-nine percent of all contracts made in both
1 See W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of
Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pirr. L. REv. 21, 31 (1984). In Poel v. Brunswick-
Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619, 620 (N.Y. 1915), the court referred to contracts that
were entered into in 1910. A clear inference from the court's opinion was that standard form
contracts were not new.
2 See Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1894). In 1888, the reverse side of
Western Union's standard message form contained non-negotiable terms limiting Western
Union's liability for failed message transmissions to the price of the transmission or, in case
of non-delivery, to fifty times that price. The Supreme Court held that Primrose accepted the
terms of the contract by writing his message and signing the blank form. See also Andrew
Burgess, Consumer Adhesion Contracts and Unfair Terms: A Critique of Current Theory
and a Suggestion, 15 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 255, 259 (1986). Burgess observes that in
England, standard form contracts run back to the end of the eighteenth century, when large
railway companies used standardized terms to disclaim liability for goods damaged during
carriage.
3 See generally Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917).
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consumer and non-consumer transactions.4 Standard forms now appear in both
paper and electronic media, and are routinely used in all manner of contractual
dealings-simple and complex-ranging from goods, to services, to intellectual
property.
The universal use of standard form contracts reflects certain economic
realities. Efficiency demands that businesses engaged in the mass production
and distribution of products develop identical contracts regulating their rights,
liabilities, and obligations.5 Substantial savings in transaction costs are realized
by the use of standard form contracts. It is simply too costly for management to
negotiate and draft individually every term that might be relevant to a particular
transaction. 6 Having counsel review individual standard forms is even more
cost prohibitive in this world of high volume transactions. Standard forms
promote the efficient use of expensive managerial and legal talent.7 The party
that drafts the standard form has the opportunity to control and allocate the
risks to which it is exposed, and the expenses that it must incur in the subject
transaction, thereby enabling the drafting party to reduce its price even more.
Further, the drafting party may be able to control remedies and enforcement
mechanisms to which it and the other party may be entitled, resulting in the
resolution of any conflict being consistent and predictable. Moreover, the use
of a standard form may lead to judicial economy, since the terms of such forms
typically will have already withstood judicial scrutiny.8 Lastly, and perhaps of
most significance, the standard form enables the drafting party to control the
conduct and limit the discretion of its employees. As a result, relatively low-
level personnel, with no special training in commercial law, can be used to
process routine transactions. 9 It should not be surprising, therefore, that modem
contract formation is dominated by the use of standard forms. In short,
"[s]tandard form contracts are a logical result of large-scale enterprise and
complex economies."'
10
So long as one party proposes a standard form contract to the other party
for the other party to accept (or reject), there is no other contract document, and
the other party accepts, there is no question of contract formation based on
4 See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971); see also John J. A. Burke, Contract
as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 290 (2000).
5 Burke, supra note 4, at 289; see also Slawson, supra note 4, at 530-3 1.
6 Gregory M. Travalio, Clearing the Air After the Battle: Reconciling Fairness and
Efficiency in a Formal Approach to U.C.C. Section 2-207, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 327, 331
(1983).
7 See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1221 (1983).
8 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 439 (2002).
9 Michael M. Greenfield & Linda J. Rusch, Limits on Standard-Form Contracting in
Revised Article 2, 32 UCC L.J. 115, 116 (1999); see also Linda J. Rusch, The Relevance of
Evolving Domestic and International Law on Contracts in the Classroom: Assumptions
About Assent, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2043, 2082 (1998).
10 Burke, supra note 4, at 290.
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varying language of conflicting forms." However, in a typical commercial
transaction for the sale of goods, the transaction is not confined to one standard
form contract. The buyer's standard form contract is contained in its purchase
order. The seller's standard form contract is contained in its invoice,
acknowledgement, or other commercial reply form. 12
The buyer's standard form is pro-buyer. Among other things, the buyer's
standard form may contain a warranty, and does not limit liability in the event
of the seller's breach. The seller's standard form is pro-seller. For example, the
seller's standard form may contain an arbitration clause, since arbitrators are
often members of the seller's trade. The seller's standard form may also limit or
even disclaim warranties, and may limit the remedy for breach. The seller's and
buyer's respective standard forms may also conflict on risk of loss, payment of
attorney's fees, payment of interest, choice of forum and choice of law, manner
and method of modifications and amendments to the contract, and even what
constitutes a default. To complicate the issues even more, each party's standard
form may also state that it constitutes the sole and exclusive contract between
the parties.
Despite the conflict between the buyer's standard form and the seller's
standard form, the parties only consider the "dickered" terms, that is, the
essential terms over which they expressly negotiated--description, price,
quantity, and delivery terms. As a result, generally, each party is ignorant of the
standard terms ("boilerplate") in the other party's document. 1 3 Once the parties
reach an agreement on the dickered terms and exchange their standard forms,
they assume that a contract has been formed.
The question then becomes what happens when one of the parties
"breaches" the agreement. Specifically, was a contract ever formed? If not,
what if the parties consummate the transaction, is there then a contract? If a
contract was formed, either initially or by virtue of performance, what are the
terms of the contract? The buyer's standard form? The seller's standard form?
Something else?
This dilemma is called the battle of the forms. This Article will examine
the historical approaches to the battle of the forms and will analyze the
problems with each putative solution. Section II discusses the pre-Code
solution; Section III explores the Code solution; and Section IV reviews the
alleged solution under the proposed revisions to the Code. Not one of these
alleged solutions satisfactorily resolves the battle of the forms; each is replete
with problems in construction, interpretation, and application. As a
consequence, this Article will conclude with the author's proposed solution to
11 Of course, absent fraud, mistake, duress, incapacity, unconscionability, or the like.
12 See E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., U.C.C. Section 2-207: An Integration of Legal
Abstractions and Transactional Reality, 46 CIN. L. REV. 419, 421 (1977); see also Travalio,
supra note 6, at 331-32.
13 See John E. Murray, Jr., Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another
Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U. PiT. L. REv. 597, 605 (1978) (reporting his
experience with over 5,000 purchasing agents that convinced him that such agents never read
the forms of sellers); see also Travalio, supra note 6, at 332-33.
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the battle of the forms. The author's solution takes into account the strengths
and inadequacies of all the other alleged solutions.
II. PRE-CODE SOLUTION
Before the drafting and adoption of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC"), the battle of the forms problem was resolved by
applying the common law contract doctrines of "mirror image" and "last shot."
At common law, the offeror was deemed to be the master of his offer.
14
That is, the offeror was master of the terms of the contract created by
acceptance of the offer. As such, the offeree could accept the offer only by
exactly complying with the terms of the offer. Unless the acceptance was
identical to the offer, that is, was a "mirror image" of the offer, which did not
omit, change, or add terms to the offer, it would not operate as an acceptance,
but rather as a rejection and a counteroffer. 15 Accordingly, no contract would
be formed. This was called the mirror image rule of contract formation. 6
Even though no contract was formed under the mirror image rule where
the seller's standard form did not "mirror" the buyer's standard form, the
parties nevertheless routinely consummated the transaction. That is, the seller
shipped the goods, and the buyer accepted the goods. Neither party anticipated
a problem since the dickered terms had been agreed upon.1 7 If all goes well, the
conflicts in the standard forms do not matter. But what happens if a dispute
arises regarding the goods? Which standard form, if any, is the controlling
document? That is, is there a contract between the parties, and if so, what are its
terms?
Common law resolved this battle of the forms problem by applying the
"last shot" rule. Under the last shot rule, the last set of terms on the table prior
to performance is the last counteroffer, and the subsequent performance
constituted acceptance of that counteroffer. A contract was formed, therefore,
pursuant to the terms contained in the counteroffer. 18 For example, suppose a
14 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 29, 58 (1979).
15 See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of White House, 36 F.3d 540, 546 (6th Cir.
1994); Cook's Pest Control, Inc. v. Rebar, 852 So. 2d. 730, 736 (Ala. 2002); see also E.
ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.21 (3d ed. 2004); JOHN EDWARD
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 48 (4th ed. 2001).
16 The case that is generally considered to be the classic example of the application of
the mirror image rule is Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915).
In Poel, the court held that a party's response which purportedly "accepted" the other party's
offer, but added the requirement that the "acceptance" be promptly acknowledged, was a
change in the offer rendering the response ineffective as an acceptance, and hence, it would
be treated as a rejection and counteroffer. Poel, 110 N.E. at 623. See also ROBERT J.
NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 37 (1970).
17 Again, generally, neither party read or otherwise knew the contents of the other's
standard form.
18 See, e.g., Alaska Pac. Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643, 655 (2d
Cir. 1947); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 992 (5th Cir. 2001);
see also JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.21 (5th ed. 2003);
MURRAY, supra note 15, § 49.
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buyer submits its standard form pro-buyer purchase order to seller to purchase
squiggles. The buyer's purchase order is generally considered to be an offer.
19
Seller "accepts" the buyer's purchase order by sending to the buyer its
conflicting standard form pro-seller acknowledgement, and then ships the
squiggles to the buyer. Under the mirror image rule, seller's acknowledgement
is not an acceptance, but rather a rejection and counteroffer. However, if the
buyer accepts the seller's shipment of squiggles, the buyer is deemed by his
acceptance of the squiggles to have accepted the seller's counteroffer, thereby
forming a contract on the terms contained in the seller's acknowledgement. The
contract is determined, therefore, by the party who submitted the last standard
form (fired the last shot) immediately before performance-in this example
20 1(and typically), the seller. Because the seller's acknowledgment ... and
shipment of [the] goods operated as a counteroffer, and the buyer's receipt and
acceptance of the goods objectively manifested his intention to accept the
counteroffer," the buyer is bound to the terms contained in the
acknowledgement. 2 That is, the terms contained in the last offer (last shot)
made before performance become the contract terms (the offer having been
accepted by performance, i.e., acceptance of the goods by the buyer).
The sole virtue of the mirror image rule and the last shot rule, if there is
one, is certainty.22 Since a contract was formed only when the parties' forms
exactly and perfectly matched, or alternatively when a party performed after
receiving a counteroffer, courts could easily determine whether or not a
contract existed, and the terms of any such contract. That virtue was attained by
ignoring reality and mechanically rendering formalistic decisions.
First, these doctrines arose in a simpler time-a time when farmers met
face to face to dicker over the terms of the sale of a horse, or cow, or pig, or a
bale of hay.23 As a result, the assumption on which these doctrines are based is
that both parties are aware, not only of each and every term in the other party's
document, but also of each and every term in its own as well. While that may
have been true at a time when commercial contracts were personally negotiated
and original documents were created for each transaction, that is not true for
today's commercial transactions.24 The practical result of the application of
these doctrines is that it puts the buyer/offeror in the position of being bound to
the terms of the seller/offeree if the parties perform, but there being no
19 See, e.g., Brown Mach. v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(recognition that purchase orders are considered to be offers to purchase).
20 See PERILLO, supra note 18, § 2.2 1(a), at 98-99.
2 1 2 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:17 (4th ed. 1991); see also
Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1166 (6th Cir. 1972).
22 See Paul Barron & Thomas W. Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review, Reflection
and Revision, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 171, 176 (1975).
23 See Phillip A. White, A Few Comments About the Proposed Revisions To UCC
Section 2-207: The Battle of the Forms Taken to the Limit of Reason, 103 CoM. L.J. 471, 474
(1998).
24 See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 22, at 173; Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg,
Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV.
1217, 1219 (1982).
[Vol. 11 : 1
ESCAPE FROM THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS
enforceable contract if the seller/offeree chooses to renege. In short, the
application of the mirror image rule and last shot rule makes no sense in
transactions entered into through the exchange of forms whose standard
preprinted terms rarely, if ever, are read by anyone involved in the
transaction.
25
Further, the mirror image rule makes no allowance for insignificant,
immaterial, or irrelevant differences in the parties' forms. If the parties intend
to enter into and be bound by a contract, the formation of the contract should
not be frustrated by the addition of a term that the parties, at best, would have
agreed to, had they known about it, or at worst, would have considered
inconsequential.
In addition, the application of the last shot rule is arbitrary. A "first shot"
rule makes just as much sense. That is, where the seller sends the goods to the
buyer after receiving the buyer's purchase order, why shouldn't the sending of
the goods constitute the seller's acceptance of buyer's purchase order, thereby
creating a contract based on the purchase order? Instead, under the last shot
rule, acceptance of the goods by the buyer after receiving the seller's
acknowledgement constitutes the buyer's acceptance of the acknowledgement,
thereby creating a contract based on the acknowledgement. There is no logical
or reasonable basis for preferring the last shot to the first shot.
26
Moreover, adopting the last shot rule ignores the factual bargain and true
27agreement of the parties. Neither party viewed the seller's acknowledgement
as a counteroffer; both viewed it as an acceptance of the buyer's offer, which
closed the deal. By making the seller's acknowledgement the contract between
the parties, the common law forced upon the parties a contract they never
made. The imposed contract consisted of unread, standard terms in the seller's
acknowledgment that both parties had ignored.2 8
The last shot rule also encourages silly gamesmanship. A savvy buyer can
send a buyer confirmation form after the seller's acknowledgment in order to
get the "last shot." The savvy seller can then retaliate by sending a sales
confirmation form. This can go on ad infinitum, with each party attempting to
fire the "last shot."
25 See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co., 380 N.E.2d 571, 578 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1978); see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business; A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 58 (1963).
26 See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 24, at 1233.
27 See John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy ofArticle 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 8 (1981); John E. Murray, Jr., The
Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 735, 752 (1982).
28 See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 22, at 173. Use of the first shot rule would be
equally unfair. If the first shot rule were used, the imposed contract similarly would consist
of unread, standard terms in the purchase order that both parties had ignored.
2007)
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III. UCC SECTION 2-207 SOLUTION
The draftsmen of UCC § 2-207, and in particular Professor Karl
Llewellyn, who was the chief architect of the UCC and the principal draftsman
of Article 2, recognized the reality of modem commercial transactions for the
sales of goods. They recognized that in the typical transaction, the seller's
standard form response (acknowledgement) to the buyer's offer contained
different terms, which under the mirror image rule resulted in no contract being
formed. They also recognized that notwithstanding the absence of a contract,
the seller then ships the goods and the buyer thereafter accepts the goods.
Despite the buyer's reasonable assumption that seller's response was an
acceptance, the buyer later finds out to his surprise that the seller's response is
a counteroffer and that he has unwittingly accepted the counteroffer by
accepting the goods, the counteroffer being the last shot fired between the
parties. Section 2-207 was promulgated to correct and remedy the injustices
and inequities caused by the mirror image rule and last shot rule in modem day
commercial transactions, and to modernize contract formation in light of
present commercial realities.29 Accordingly, UCC § 2-207 was intended to
apply to modem commercial transactions where there is virtually exclusive
reliance on standard form contracts.
30
Section 2-207 provides as follows:
§ 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract
is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the
parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the
29 See, e.g., Brewster of Lynchburg, Inc. v. Dial Corp., 33 F.3d 355, 362 (4th Cir.
1994); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Diamond Fruit
Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986); Frank M. Booth, Inc. v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 754 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Transwestern Pipeline Co.
v. Monsanto Co., 46 Cal. App. 4th 502, 514 (1996); Uniroyal, Inc., 380 N.E.2d at 578.
30 See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 22, at 173.
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particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the
parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under
any other provisions of this Act.
31
Despite the best intentions of the drafters, it became clear almost
immediately that § 2-207 was a "puzzling, '32 "enigmatic, ' 33 "murky bit of
prose" 34 that was a "statutory disaster whose every word invites problems in
construction" 35 and was "incapable of generating consistently defensible
interpretations and results." 36 It has even been compared to "an amphibious
tank that was originally designed to fight in the swamps, but was sent to fight in
the desert." 37 Others have characterized it as being "shrouded in uncertainty.,
38
Rather than fairly resolving the battle of the forms, § 2-207 has proved to be "a
defiant, lurking demon patiently waiting to condemn its interpreters to the
depths of despair."
39
31 UCC § 2-207 (1966). All references to the 1966 UCC incorporate any subsequent
amendments prior to the revisions of Article 1 and Article 2 in 2001 and 2003, respectively.
32 Charles M. Thatcher, Sales Contract Formation and Content-An Annotated
Apology for a Proposed Revision of Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207, 32 S.D. L.REv.
181, 183 (1987).
33 Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 460 F. Supp. 163, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
34 Sw. Eng'g Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 473 P.2d 18, 25 (Kan. 1970).
35 Baird & Weisberg, supra note 24, at 1224. Moreover, in a letter to Professor Robert
Summers, Grant Gilmore, one of the principal drafters of the Code, made the following
statement regarding UCC § 2-207:
The 1952 version of 2-207 was bad enough.. . but the addition of subsection (3),
without the slightest explanation of how it was supposed to mesh with (1) and (2),
turned the section into a complete disaster....
My principal quarrel with your discussion of 2-207-and all the other discussions I
have read-is that you treat the section much too respectfully-as if it had sprung, all
of a piece, like Minerva from the brow of Jove. The truth is that it was a miserable,
bungled, patched-up job-both text and Comment-to which various hands-
Llewellyn, Honnold, Braucher and my anonymous hack-contributed at various points,
each acting independently of the others (like the blind men and the elephant). It strikes
me as ludicrous to pretend that the section can, or should, be construed as an integrated
whole in light of what "the draftsman" "intended." (I might note that, when subsection
(3) was added, Llewellyn had ceased to have anything to do with the code project).
Letter from Professor Grant Gilmore to Professor Robert Summers (Sept. 10, 1980),
reprinted in RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, ROBERT S. SUMMERS & JAMES J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAW: TEACHING MATERIALS 54-55 (3d ed. 1981).
36 Comeill A. Stephens, On Ending the Battle of the Forms: Problems with Solutions,
80 Ky. L.J. 815, 822 (1991).
37 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-3, at 30
(5th ed. 2000).
38 Travalio, supra note 6, at 328.
39 Reaction Molding Techs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1097, 1104 (E.D. Pa.
1984), amended by 588 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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A. UCC Section 2-207(1)
Section 2-207 states that:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
40
Section 2-207(1) abolished the rigid mirror image rule by treating the
offeree's response as an acceptance even where it does not mirror the offer. A
response to an offer that is an "expression of acceptance" is treated as an
acceptance, even though the response contains terms that are different from or
additional to the terms that are in the offer. In other words, § 2-207(1) converts
a common law counteroffer into an acceptance, even though it contains
41different or additional terms. Section 2-207(1) was designed to recognize as a
contract "a proposed deal which in commercial understanding has in fact been
closed ....,,42 Section 2-207(1), therefore, focuses on whether there has been a
bargain in fact, not whether there has been a bargain in form.
43
1. Expression ofAcceptance Standard
Although abolishing the mirror image is commendable, § 2-207(1) is
problematic at best. Neither § 2-207(1) nor the comments to § 2-207 indicate
what criteria should be applied in determining what constitutes a "definite
expression of acceptance." One could apply the reasonable person standard,
and look at whether or not a reasonable person would view the response of the
offeree as a "definite expression of acceptance." Alternatively, one could use
the subjective standard, and look at whether or not the offeree subjectively
intended his response to be a "definite expression of acceptance." On the other
hand, applying the same subjective standard, one could require that the
40 UCC § 2-207(1) (1966).
41 Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1979).
42 See UCC § 2-207 cmt. 2 (1966) ("Under this Article a proposed deal which in
commercial understanding has in fact been closed is recognized as a contract.").
43 Professor Murray calls this "intention over terms." See John E. Murray, Jr., Intention
Over Terms: An Exploration of UCC 2-207 and New Section 60, Restatement of Contracts,
37 FORDHAM L. REV. 317 (1969). See also John E. Murray, Jr., The Realism of Behaviorism
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 OR. L. REV. 269, 299 (1972), wherein Professor
Murray states:
In order for commercial practices to expand, i.e., to change, and in order for the law to
react effectively to these changes, courts must become accustomed to digging into the
nature of the practices surrounding the transaction. In order for courts to determine
what the bargain of the parties was, in fact, courts must begin to empathize with the
behavior patterns of the parties under the particular circumstances of their transaction.
This requires empirical verification which will, on many occasions, require courts to
depart from the documentary evidence of the transaction and consider other
manifestations of the parties and the surrounding circumstances to identify more
precisely their circle of assent. Parties do make agreements in fact and these are the
agreements which should be enforced-not the agreements mechanically constructed
from the printed pieces of paper which the parties happened to use as partial tools.
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response of the offeree is a "definite expression of acceptance" only where the
offeror subjectively viewed it as such.
2. Expression ofAcceptance Determination
Another problem with § 2-207(1) is that it fails to clarify what constitutes
a "definite expression of acceptance." How much can a response differ from
the offer and still be considered a "definite expression of acceptance?"
Apparently there is no limit. Both § 2-207(2) and Comment 344 to § 2-207
make it clear that a contract is formed even though the different or additional
terms in the "definite expression of acceptance" materially alter the offer. That
is, a party's response that materially alters the offer can still be treated as a
"definite expression of acceptance" under § 2-207(1). Although that position
seems to be patently nonsensical, § 2-207(1) nonetheless adopts it. If an
offeree's response to an offer is materially different from the offer, if it
materially alters the offer, then it defies logic and common sense to view that
response as a "definite expression of acceptance." Even in the absence of the
mirror image rule, such a response that materially alters the offer indicates that
the offer is unacceptable. Another term for a response that indicates that an
offer is unacceptable is "rejection." Section 2-207 does not divulge the legal
legerdemain that was used to convert a clear rejection into a definite expression
of acceptance. Nor does § 2-207 or the related Comments explain how a
response to an offer that materially altered the offer can be considered to be a
"definite" expression of acceptance. At best, the response is an indefinite
expression of acceptance, or a definite expression of non-acceptance.
3. Confirmation
Another perplexing element of § 2-207(1) is the provision that "a written
confirmation ... operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon . . . ,45 What is
baffling about this language is that, by definition, a confirmation confirms that
a contract has already been made. A confirmation is not itself an acceptance, it
confirms that there has already been an offer and an acceptance. Moreover, if a
confirmation states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, as set forth in § 2-207(1), then it cannot be a confirmation. Again, by
definition, a confirmation purportedly confirms what the parties have already
agreed upon.46
4. Conditional Acceptance
Section 2-207(1) further provides that a definite expression of acceptance
will operate as an acceptance "unless acceptance is expressly made conditional
on assent to the additional or different terms." The formulation of this proviso
44 See UCC § 2-207 cmt. 3 (1966) ("Whether or not additional or different terms will
become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection (2). If they are such
as materially to alter the original bargain, they will not be included unless expressly agreed
to by the other party.").
41 See UCC § 2-207(1) (1966).
46 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "confirmation" as "[t]he
act of verifying or corroborating; a statement that verifies or corroborates").
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is also puzzling. An "acceptance" which is expressly made conditional on
assent to additional or different terms is not an acceptance. Rather, a response
to an offer which purports to be an acceptance, but is conditional on the
offeror's assent to terms additional to or different from those offered is a
counteroffer.4 7
Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, § 2-207(1) eliminates the mirror image
rule in recognition of the modem commercial reality that the parties to a
commercial contract for the sale of goods generally only consider the dickered
terms and do not read or have knowledge of the boilerplate language.
Accordingly, § 2-207(1) takes the approach that different or additional terms in
a response to an offer do not prevent the response from being a definite
expression of acceptance nor do they prevent the formation of a contract, even
where such different or additional terms materially alter the offer. If one
accepts that approach, which evidently the drafters of the Code did, then the
above-referenced conditional language, to the extent it is boilerplate, should be
treated the same as the rest of the boilerplate. It should not affect an acceptance
or the formation of a contract. If boilerplate language which materially alters
the offer does not preclude an acceptance, such conditional language that is
boilerplate also should not preclude an acceptance.
Moreover, courts are even divided on when an acceptance is "expressly
made conditional" on assent to the additional or different terms. Some courts
hold that an acceptance that states a term that materially alters an offer to the
disadvantage of the offeror is an acceptance expressly conditional on assent to
the additional or different terms. 48 Other courts hold that in order for the
"expressly conditional" language to apply, the acceptance must be expressly
conditional on the offeror's assent to the additional or different terms, and the
offeror's assent must be directly and distinctly expressed rather than implied.49
Other courts fall between these two extremes and provide that whether or not
an acceptance is "expressly conditional" may be implied from the language of
the acceptance, whether or not it is a material alteration.
50
B. UCC Section 2-207(2)
UCC § 2-207(2) provides:
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
47 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 (1979).
48 See, e.g., Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
49 See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
so See, e.g., Constr. Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robbins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
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(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. l
If a contract is found under § 2-207(1), that is, if there is an expression of
acceptance (acceptance) by the offeree, but the acceptance contains different or
additional terms from the offer, the next question becomes, what are the terms
of the contract? The offer? The acceptance? Section 2-207(2) "answers" that
question in an inartful, confusing, and perhaps even incomprehensible manner.
1. Merchants Versus Non-Merchants
First, § 2-207(2) has one rule if the contract is between merchants, and a
different rule if the contract is not between merchants. Generally, a merchant is
one "who deals in goods" of the type involved in the contract, or is an expert
with respect to the goods involved in the transaction. 52 Under § 2-207(2), if the
contract is not between merchants, that is, if one or both of the parties to the
contract is not a merchant, the additional terms in the acceptance are treated as
proposals. That is to say, the additional terms in the acceptance "fall out," and
the terms of the contract are the terms contained in the offer. This has been
called the "fall out rule." 53 The effect of using the fall out rule in such a
contract is that the last shot rule that emanated from the use of the mirror image
rule under common law, has morphed into the first shot rule under the Code.
So, instead of mechanically applying the arbitrary last shot rule to resolve the
battle of the forms as would be required under common law, § 2-207(2)
requires us to mechanically apply the arbitrary first shot rule. The contract
under the Code then is determined by the offeror rather than the offeree. The
first shot rule does achieve the result of making the offeror the master of his
offer again. However, the drafters of § 2-207 apparently did not see that as a
consistently worthy goal since they saw fit to apply the first shot rule only to
contracts not between merchants, and not to contracts between merchants.
Neither the Code nor the Comments proffer any justification or rationale
why the terms of a contract formed under § 2-207(1) should be contingent upon
whether both of the parties are merchants or why the first shot rule is used in a
contract not between merchants. If the purpose for the distinction between
merchants and non-merchants was to protect consumer buyers (non-merchants)
from being victimized in the battle of the forms by merchant sellers, by binding
the consumer buyer to terms to in the seller's acknowledgment to which the
consumer did not agree, then the protection is not needed. Consumer buyers
typically do not use their own standard form contracts when dealing with
" UCC § 2-207(2) (1966).
52 UCC § 2-104(1) (1966) states that a merchant "means a person who deals in goods
of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or
skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who
by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill." See, e.g., Vince v.
Broome, 443 So. 2d 23 (Miss. 1983); Foley v. Dayton Bank & Trust, 696 S.W.2d 356 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1985).
53 See, e.g., Reaction Molding Techs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D.
Pa. 1984), amended by 588 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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merchant sellers, and there is no exchange of standard form contracts.
Accordingly, the battle of the forms issues never arise. If the purpose for the
distinction is not to protect consumers, then no distinction should have been
made.
2. Material Alteration
If a contract formed under § 2-207(1) is between merchants, the additional
terms in the acceptance become part of the contract. 54 So now § 2-207 has
shuttled back to the last shot doctrine, and made the terms of the acceptance
the terms of the contract. It would have been too simple and straightforward for
that to have been the entirety of § 2-207(2). Section 2-207(2), not content with
already being a model of ambiguity, further provides that such additional terms
in the acceptance do not become part of the contract if, inter alia, the additional
terms "materially alter" the offer.55 The obvious question that arises is when is
an additional term considered a material alteration? Neither "material" nor
"materially alter" is defined anywhere in the Code.
Comment 4 to § 2-207 indicates, but does not directly state, that the
standard to be utilized in determining whether the acceptance materially alters
the offer is "surprise" or "hardship.' 56 Comment 4 then cites four terms that
would be material alterations.57 If surprise or hardship were the criterion,
however, then virtually every additional term in the acceptance would be a
material alteration. That is, the battle of the forms problem is based on terms in
the acceptance that are not read by the offeror and redound to the detriment of
the offeror. Therefore, all additional terms in the acceptance would meet the
surprise or hardship requirement. Consequently, if one reads Comment 4
literally, the "material alteration" exception would swallow the rule. If
Comment 4 is not read literally, then it is not clear how to read it.
For reasons unknown, when Comment 4 cites four examples of material
alteration, the only example appearing regularly in standard forms is the
warranty disclaimer. The comment ignores several other terms that generally
appear in standard forms, including arbitration, risk of loss, payment of
attorneys' fees, and modification of contract terms. As a result, courts are in
conflict whether these terms constitute a material alteration.58 There is even a
14 See UCC § 2-207(2) (1966).
55 Id.
56 UCC § 2-207 cmt. 4 (1966) provides:
Examples of typical clauses which would normally "materially alter" the contract and
so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by the other
party are: a clause negating such standard warranties as that of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose in circumstances in which either warranty normally
attaches; a clause requiring a guaranty of 90% or 100% deliveries in a case such as a
contract by cannery, where the usage of the trade allows greater quantity leeways; a
clause reserving to the seller the power to cancel upon the buyer's failure to meet any
invoice when due; a clause requiring that complaints be made in a time materially
shorter than customary or reasonable.
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. El Paso Pipe & Supply Co., 978 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir.
1992); Altronics of Bethlehem, Inc. v. Repco, Inc., 957 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1992); Sethness-
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conflict whether vel non the determination of a material alteration is a question
of law or a question of fact.59 With respect to an arbitration clause, for example,
some courts have ruled that as a matter of law the addition of an arbitration
clause is a material alteration,60 while other courts have ruled that whether the
addition of an arbitration clause is a material alteration is an issue of fact.
61
Further, curiously, Comment 4 cites as an example of a material alteration
"a clause reserving to the seller the power to cancel upon the buyer's failure to
meet any invoice when due." Payment of the invoice when due is the buyer's
principal, if not sole, obligation. 62 The Code recognizes this in § 2-703 by
allowing a seller to cancel the contract where the buyer "fails to make a
payment due .. ,,63 Consequently, if such a clause is in the seller's
acknowledgment, not only should it not be a surprise, but since cancellation is
already allowed by the Code where the buyer fails to pay when due, it is not
even an alteration, much less a material alteration.
64
Comment 5 to § 2-207 lists additional terms that are not deemed to
materially alter an offer. True to form, the drafters of § 2-207 continue their
apparent effort to confound, confuse, and frustrate any effort to resolve the
battle of the forms smoothly. Comment 5 changes the Comment 4 standard of
material alteration from "surprise" or "hardship" to "unreasonable surprise,"
and does not even mention hardship. 65 Of course, Comment 5 does not set forth
Greenleaf, Inc. v. Green River Corp., 65 F.3d 64 (7th Cir. 1995); see also William H. Danne,
Jr., Annotation, What Are Additional Terms Materially Altering Contract Within Meaning of
UCC§ 2-207(2)(b), 72 A.L.R.3d 479 (1976).
59 See, e.g., Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1983);
Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 437 N.E.2d 22 (I11. App. Ct.
1982).
60 See, e.g., Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 239 (N.Y. 1978);
Just Born, Inc. v. Stein, Hall & Co., 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 407 (C.P. Northampton 1971); In re
Barclay Knitwear Co., 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
61 See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); see also
Silverstyle Dress Co. v. Aero-Knit Mills, Inc., 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
62 See UCC § 2-301 (1966).
63 See UCC § 2-703 (1966).
64 See 3 RICHARD W. DUESENBERG & LAWRENCE P. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3.02 (1990).
65 UCC § 2-207 cmt. 5 (1966) provides:
Examples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable surprise and which
therefore are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice of objection is seasonable
given are: a clause setting forth and perhaps enlarging slightly upon the seller's
exemption due to supervening causes beyond his control, similar to those covered by
the provision of this article on merchant's excuse by failure of presupposed conditions
or a clause fixing in advance any reasonable formula of proration under such
circumstances; a clause fixing a reasonable time for complaints within customary
limits, or in the case of a purchase for sub-sale, providing for inspection by the sub-
purchaser; a clause providing for interest on overdue invoices or fixing the seller's
standard credit terms where they are within the range of trade practice and do not limit
any credit bargained for; a clause limiting the right of rejection for defects which fall
within the customary trade tolerances for acceptance "with adjustment" or otherwise
limiting remedy in a reasonable manner.
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how one determines whether a surprise is unreasonable. Nor does Comment 5
explain why "hardship" was eliminated altogether as a criterion for determining
material alteration. Having read Comments 4 and 5, one is now left to guess on
the standard to be applied to determine whether a term in an acceptance is a
material alteration. Is the standard "surprise," or "unreasonable surprise," or
"hardship?"
The difficulty in using examples to define material alteration is its
tendency to lead to per se rules. Ignored by § 2-207 is the fact that what is or is
not a material alteration is dependent upon a number of factors and variables,
including the value of the transaction, the quantity involved in the transaction,
the relationship of the parties to each other, the custom and usage of the trade,
and the course of dealing and course of performance between the parties.
66
Only by considering all of the above factors can a court make a determination
whether a term is truly a material alteration.
3. Additional Versus Different Terms
In determining the terms of a contract formed under § 2-207(1), § 2-207(2)
only addresses additional terms contained in the acceptance. It does not address
different terms contained in the acceptance. Of course, an additional term in the
acceptance would be, in fact, a different term from what is contained in the
offer. In fact, all different terms are additional, and all additional terms are
67different. One can conclude, therefore, that "additional terms" referred to in §
2-207 were meant to include both different and additional terms. Although not
directly addressed in the Code, Comment 3 to § 2-207 lends some support to
that interpretation when it states: "Whether or not additional or different terms
will become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection
(2)."68 Some courts and commentators, relying on Comment 3 and the above
analysis, believe that "different" was inadvertently omitted from § 2-207(2),
and that § 2-207(2) should be read as though "different" were included,69 and
any attempt to distinguish "different" from "additional" would be "hair-
splitting" and "metaphysical. 7 °
Other courts and commentators observe that § 2-207(1) refers to both
"different" and "additional" terms, indicating that "different terms" were not
subsumed in "additional terms." As a result, they take the position that if the
drafters intended for § 2-207(2) to include different terms, they would have
included "different" in the text of § 2-207(2). The absence of "different" in the
text of § 2-207(2) means that the intent of § 2-207(2) was only to include
additional terms, not different terms. 71 In addition, it can be argued that
66 See Murray, supra note 13.
67 See Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994); see also
MURRAY, supra note 15, § 50, at 187.
68 See UCC § 2-207 cmt. 3 (1966).
69 See, e.g., Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., Inc., 569 P.2d 751 (Cal. 1977); see also
MURRAY, supra note 15, § 50, at 186-87.
70 Northrop Corp., 29 F.3d at 1175.
71 See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 (6th Cir. 1972); S.
Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 567 P.2d 1246, 1253 (Idaho 1977);
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different terms were not meant to be included in § 2-207(2) because no
different term would ever survive § 2-207(2)(c).72 That is, any different term in
the acceptance would have already have been objected to by the different term
in the offer, resulting in the different term in the acceptance not becoming part
of the contract. For example, if the buyer's purchase order provides for a three
year warranty, then a "notification of objection ... has already been given" to a
warranty disclaimer or any other different term in the seller's acknowledgment.
This is more that just a matter of semantics. If § 2-207(2) does not apply to
different terms, then the question that arises is what are the terms of the
contract when the acceptance contains different terms from the offer? If § 2-
207(2) only applies to additional terms, but not different terms, then one must
engage in the "metaphysical" and "hair-splitting" exercise of distinguishing
between different terms and additional terms, however disingenuous that may
be. In such a case, an additional term may be construed to be a term in the
acceptance that alludes to a matter not addressed in the offer, whereas a
different term may be construed to be a term in the acceptance that conflicts
with a term in the offer. Courts and commentators who have taken the position
that § 2-207(2) does not address different terms in the acceptance are split as to
how to handle such different terms. Some take the position that the different
terms in the offer and acceptance "knockout" each other.73 The contract,
therefore, becomes the terms on which the parties agree, with the Code
supplementing or filling any gaps in the contract. 74 This is called the "knockout
rule." For example, suppose that the buyer's purchase order contains a warranty
clause providing for three-year warranty on the goods to be purchased. The
seller accepts the purchase order of the buyer by responding with an
acknowledgement that contains a clause disclaiming all warranties. Under the
knockout rule, the warranties clauses knock out each other. The contract,
therefore, under the knockout rule, would not provide for a warranty. The
warranty gap in the contract is filled in and supplemented by the Code gap
fillers. Since the Code does not provide a three-year warranty, there is no three-
year warranty.
75
Am. Parts Co. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 154 N.W.2d 5, 11 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967); Reaction
Molding Techs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1097, 1106 (E.D. Pa. 1984); see also
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, § 1-3, at 32; John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the
"Battle of the Forms ": Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1355-56 (1986).
72 Under § 2-207(2)(c), between merchants, the additional terms in the acceptance
become part of the contract unless "notification of objection to them has already been given
or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received." UCC § 2-207(2)(c)
(1966).
73 See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984);
Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. R.J. Sanders, Inc., 711 A.2d 628, 635 (R.I. 1998); Gardner
Zemke Co. v. Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319, 326-27 (N.M. 1983).
74 See, e.g., St. Paul Structural Steel Co. v. ABI Contracting, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 83, 86
(N.D. 1985); Daitom, Inc., 741 F.2d at 1579; S. Idaho Pipe & Steel Co., 567 P.2d at 1254.
75 There may be an implied warranty of merchantability under UCC § 2-314, but that
would not extend to future performance.
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The asserted basis for applying the knockout rule for different terms is
Comment 676 of § 2-207.7 7 However, Comment 6, by its terms, is expressly
restricted to different terms in conflicting confirmation forms; that is, forms that
confirm the existence of a contract where there has already been an offer and
acceptance. It does not address what § 2-207(2) addresses, to wit, variant terms
in the offer and acceptance themselves. 78 Reliance on Comment 6 to support
the use of the knockout rule in § 2-207(2), therefore, is misplaced. Realizing
that neither § 2-207(2) nor Comment 6 support the use of the knockout rule
where different terms are contained in the acceptance, other cases and
commentators support the use of the "fall out rule" where different terms
appear in the acceptance. 79 That is to say, different terms in the acceptance fall
out and are not part of the contract. In the foregoing example, where the
buyer's purchase order provided for a three-year warranty on the purchased
goods, but the seller's acknowledgement provided that all warranties were
disclaimed, the disclaimer in the seller's acknowledgement would fall out of
the contract. The contract then, under the fall out rule, would require a three-
year warranty.
4. Fall Out Rule Versus Knockout Rule with Respect to Merchants
Section 2-207(2) provides that in a transaction between merchants, the
additional (or additional and different) terms in the acceptance become part of
the contract unless the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer, the additional terms materially alter the offer, or the offeror objects to the
additional terms. In effect, in a contract between merchants, the old last shot
rule is used unless one of the above three exceptions applies. If one of the
exceptions applies, the additional terms then would not become part of the
contract. True to form, however, another problem arises. Do the additional
terms in the acceptance simply fall out so the contract becomes the offer? Do
the additional terms in the acceptance knockout the conflicting terms in the
offer so that neither the additional terms in the acceptance nor the conflicting
76 UCC § 2-207 cmt. 6 (1966) provides:
If no answer is received within a reasonable time after additional terms are proposed, it
is both fair and commercially sound to assume that their inclusion has been assented to.
Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict each party must be
assumed to object to a clause of the other conflicting with one on the confirmation sent
by himself. As a result the requirement that there be notice of objection which is found
in subsection (2) is satisfied and the conflicting terms do not become a part of the
contract. The contract then consists of the terms originally expressly agreed to, terms on
which the confirmations agree, and terms supplied by this act, including subsection (2).
The written confirmation is also subject to Section 2-201. Under that section a failure to
respond permits enforcement of a prior oral agreement; under this section failure to
respond permits additional terms to become part of the agreement. [Emphasis added.]
77 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, § 1-3. Professor White subscribes to the
knockout rule.
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., Reaction Molding Techs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1097, 1106
(E.D. Pa. 1984); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, § 1-3. Professor Summers
subscribes to the fall out rule.
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terms in the offer are part of the contract? In other words, is the fall out rule or
the knockout rule used? Again, if the fall out rule was used, the contract would
be the offer. If the knockout rule was used, the contract would be those terms
upon which the parties agree. If there was a gap in the contract, it would be
filled and supplemented by the Code. Use of either rule would technically
comply with § 2-207(2) as it relates to merchants. Not surprisingly, the Code
provides no guidance as to which rule to apply.
C. UCC Section 2-207(3)
UCC § 2-207(3) provides:
Conduct by both parties, which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the
parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the
particular contract consist of those on which the writings of the parties
agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any
other provisions of this Act.
8
Section 2-207(3) applies to situations where the parties consummate a
transaction, even though no contract is formed by the writings of the parties. In
such a case, there is apparently a contract by conduct. Section 2-207(3)
attempts to articulate the terms of this contract by conduct. Not surprisingly,
and consistent with the other provisions of § 2-207, questions have arisen
regarding the proper interpretation of § 2-207(3).
1. Supplemental Terms
Section 2-207(3) formally adopts the knockout rule in that it provides that
where a contract is formed under § 2-207(3), the contract consists of those
terms on which the parties agree, with the Code supplementing the contract by
filling in any gaps. However, courts have clashed over which supplemental
terms of the Code may be used as gap-fillers. Some courts take the position that
the supplemental terms to be supplied by the Code may include only the terms
which are expressly stated in the Code, such as an implied warranty.8 Other
courts have observed that UCC § 1-205(3) 82 provides that course of dealing and
trade usage give meaning to, supplement, and qualify the terms of a contract. In
addition, pursuant to UCC § 2-208(1), course of performance is also made part
'0 UCC § 2-207 (1966).
81 See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1977).
82 UCC § 1-205(3) (1966) ("A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade
in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware
give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement."); UCC § 1-
205(1) (1966) ("A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to
a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of
understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct."); UCC § 1-205(2)
(1966) ("A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to the transaction in question...").
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of a contract. 83 As a result, those courts argue that the terms of a contract
formed under § 2-207(3) include not only the express provisions of the Code,
but also course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage.
84
2. Effect of Performance
A second problem relating to the proper interpretation of § 2-207(3)
involves the effect of performance when no contract has been formed under §
2-207(1). Some courts hold that if no contract is formed under § 2-207(1)
because the response is not a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance,
but the parties subsequently perform, then § 2-207(3) applies. However, if no
contract is formed under § 2-207(1) because the response, while a definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance, is expressly made conditional on assent to
the additional or different terms, then § 2-207(3) does not apply. Rather, the
response is treated as a common law counteroffer, and performance by the
offeror (typically acceptance of the goods) constitutes acceptance of the
offeree's terms. The contract then is formed on the offeree's terms.85 One could
call that approach the resurrection of the last shot rule.
A different approach taken by other courts is that any time a contract is not
formed under § 2-207(1), whether it is because there is no definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance, or because the acceptance was expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms, but the parties
subsequently perform, then § 2-207(3) applies. Under this approach, the
contract then would be as provided in § 2-207(3), that is, the terms on which
the writings of the parties agree, supplemented by terms provided by the code
86(knockout rule).
3. One Form or Two Forms
As stated earlier, § 2-207 was drafted to resolve the battle of the forms.
That is, § 2-207 was meant to resolve the issues of contract formation and
contract terms when parties to a transaction exchange forms and the offeror's
standard form does not match the offeree's standard form. Accordingly, many
courts argue that § 2-207 has no application where there is no battle of the
forms, as where there the contract is oral and there are no standard forms
exchanged, or where there is only one standard form. To further buttress the
argument, they point out that the language of § 2-207(3) expressly provides that
conduct is sufficient to establish a contract where "the writings of the parties do
83 UCC § 2-208(1) (1966) ("Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for
performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement.").
84 See, e.g., Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1450 (7th Cir. 1992).
85 See Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962);
Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 905, 906 (D. Conn. 1970); Bickett v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. (CBC) 629, 643-44 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
86 See Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1166 (6th Cir. 1972); Constr.
Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 921 (1969).
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not otherwise establish a contract." Therefore, unless both parties have
exchanged their respective "writings," § 2-207(3) cannot apply. 87 If § 2-207(3)
does not apply, the terms of the contract formed by the conduct of the party will
be determined by the last shot doctrine. That is, the terms of the last
counteroffer before performance will be the contract. Predictably, consistent
with the rest of § 2-207, the courts are in conflict. Other courts apply § 2-
207(3) whenever a contract has not been formed, but the parties nevertheless
perform (consummate the transaction) without regard to an exchange of forms
or the number of forms.
88
IV. REVISED ARTICLE 2 SOLUTION
Current § 2-207 is irreparably fraught with problems and inconsistencies.
Cases and commentators are hopelessly divided on when it should be applied,
how it should be applied, and how it should be interpreted. To paraphrase
Winston Churchill, § 2-207 has proven to be a riddle, packed in a Xpuzzle,
wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma, surrounded by a conundrum. In an
attempt to end the havoc wrought by § 2-207, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute
proposed and approved amendments to UCC Article 2, including § 2-207.9"
A. Formation of Contract
The proposed revisions to Article 2 extricate the formation segment from §
2-207 and place it in Revised § 2-204, the formation section. Revised § 2-204
reads as follows:
SECTION 2-204. FORMATION IN GENERAL.
9 1
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to
show agreement, including offer and acceptance, conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of stieh a contract, the interaction of
electronic agents, or the interaction of an electronic agent and an
individual.
87 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997); Slocomb
Indus., Inc. v. Chelsea Indus., 36 UCC Rep. Serv. 1543 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Album Graphics,
Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Lockwood Corp. v.
Black, 501 F. Supp. 261, 265 (N.D. Tex. 1980), af'd, 669 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1982).
88 See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
89 In a radio broadcast on October 1, 1939, Winston Churchill said of Russia: "It is a
riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma." Winston S. Churchill, The First Month of
War (radio broadcast Oct. 1, 1939), in 6 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: His COMPLETE SPEECHES
1897-1963, at 6160 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974). Section 2-207 is even worse.
90 The Uniform Law Commissioners ("ULC") approved the amendments in Summer,
2002. The American Law Institute (ALT") approved the amendments in Spring, 2003. The
Uniform Commercial Code is a joint enterprise of the ALI and ULC.
91 The underlined portions are additions to the original text; strikes are deletions from
the original text. UCC § 2-204 (2003).
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(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found
even though if the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even theoigh if one or more terms are left open a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.
(4) Except as otherwise provided in Sections 2-211 through 2-213, the
following rules apply:
(a) A contract may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents of
the parties, even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the electronic
agents' actions or the resulting terms and agreements.
(b) A contract may be formed by the interaction of an electronic agent
and an individual acting on the individual's own behalf or for another
person. A contract is formed if the individual takes actions that the
individual is free to refuse to take or makes a statement that the
individual has reason to know will:
(i) cause the electronic agent to complete the transaction or performance;
or
(ii) indicate acceptance of an offer, regardless of other expressions or
actions by the individual to which the electronic agent cannot react.
The effect of this change is that Revised § 2-207 only deals with contract terms,
instead of contract terms and contract formation, both of which are the subject
of the current § 2-207, and Revised § 2-204 only deals with contract formation.
This move has the advantage of consolidating contract formation in one
section. Revised § 2-204 provides that a contract can be formed in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including offer and acceptance, and conduct.
Revised § 2-204 apparently recognizes, therefore, that an offer and acceptance
and conduct are just two of the ways, but not the only ways, in which a contract
may be formed. However, it is not clear in what other ways a contract can be
formed, and Revised § 2-204 does not clarify that uncertainty.
One critical question raised by Revised § 2-204 is what constitutes an
acceptance? That issue is addressed in Revised § 2-206, which provides:
SECTION 2-206. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE IN FORMATION
OF CONTRACT.92
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance
in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances;
92 The underlined portions are additions to the original text; strikes are deletions from
the original text. UCC § 2-206 (2003).
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(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment
shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to
ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-
conforming goods, but stha the shipment of non-conforming goods
does not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the
buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the
buyer.
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode
of acceptance an offeror who that is not notified of acceptance within a
reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance.
(3) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance in a record
operates as an acceptance even if it contains terms additional to or
different from the offer.
Unfortunately, Revised § 2-206(3) has continued the ambiguous and
problematic formulation of what constitutes an acceptance: "A definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance in a record operates as an acceptance even
if it contains terms additional to or different from the offer." Although the
mirror image rule is rejected,93 Revised § 2-206(3) suffers from the same
shortcomings as the current Code. Neither Revised § 2-206, nor the comments
to Revised § 2-206, clarify what constitutes an expression of acceptance. To
what extent must a response be so different from the offer that it is no longer
considered to be a "definite expression of acceptance," but rather a rejection?
What standard is used to determine whether a response is a "definite expression
of acceptance"? Just like the current Code, these questions are not answered in
the Revised Code.
B. Terms of Contract
Revised § 2-207 only applies if a contract has been formed under Revised
§ 2-204.
If a contract has been formed under Revised § 2-204, Revised § 2-207 is
applied to determine the terms of that contract.94 Revised § 2-207 provides:
9' UCC § 2-206 cmt. 2 (2003) states: "The mirror image rule is rejected in subsection
(3), but any responsive record must still be fairly regarded as an 'acceptance' and not as a
proposal for a different transaction such that it should be construed to be a rejection of the
offer." UCC § 2-206 cmt. 2 (2003).
94 UCC § 2-207 cmt. 2 (2003) states:
This section applies only when a contract has been formed under other provisions of
Article 2. This section functions solely to define the terms of the contract. When forms
are exchanged before or during performance, the result from the application of this
section differs from the original Section 2-207 and the common law in that this section
gives no preference to the first or the last form; it applies the same test to the terms in
each. Terms in a record that insist on all of that record's terms and no others as a
condition of contract formation have no effect on the operation of this section. When
one party's record insists on its own terms as a condition to contract formation, if that
party does not subsequently perform or otherwise acknowledge the existence of a
contract, if the other party does not agree to those terms, the record's insistence on its
2007]
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SECTION 2-207. ADDITIONAL TERMS IN ACCEPTANCE OR
TERMS OF CONTRACT: EFFECT OF CONFIRMATION.
95
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance er a writte
confirmation Awhieh is sent within a reasenable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless aeceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional termns are to be eensmed as proposals for addition to
the entaet. Be.. een m.erc.hants sch terms become pat of the ontr
untless:
(a) the offer expressly, limt acetne to the terms of the offer;
(b) they m ateally alter i; or
(e) notification of objection to them has already been gie orisgie
within a reasonable time aftr notice of them is received.
(3) conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract
is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of th
paties do not othehrise establish a contract. in such case the teis the
partetula contract consist of those tenns on which the wfitings of the
pariesagretogether with any supplementar-' terms incorporated unde
any other provisions of this Act.
If (i) conduct by both parties recognizes the existence of a contract
although their records do not otherwise establish a contract. (ii) a contract
is formed by an offer and acceptance, or (iii) a contract formed in any
manner is confirmed by a record that contains terms additional to or
different from those in the contract being confirmed, the terms of the
contract, subject to Section 2-202, are:
(a) terms that appear in the records of both parties;
(b) terms, whether in a record or not, to which both parties agree; and
(c) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of this Act.
This section is perhaps the biggest disappointment of the Revised Code.
Applying Revised § 2-207 to determine the terms of a contract raises several
questions and problems. Comment 1 makes it clear that Revised § 2-207
own terms will keep a contract from being formed under Sections 2-204 or 2-206, and
this section is not applicable. As with original Section 2-207, courts will have to
distinguish between "confirmations" that are addressed in this section and
"modifications" that are addressed in Section 2-209.
95 The underlined portions are additions to the original text; strikes are deletions from
the original text. UCC § 2-207 (2003).
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applies to all contracts for the sale of goods. 96 As stated above, Revised § 2-204
states that a contract may be made in any manner sufficient to show an
agreement, including, inter alia, offer and acceptance, and conduct. Again,
Revised § 2-204 apparently recognizes, therefore, that an offer and acceptance
and conduct are just two of the ways, but not the only ways, in which a contract
may be formed. However, Revised § 2-207 does not indicate what the terms are
in a contract formed in such other ways. It only addresses contracts formed by
offer and acceptance and by conduct. This problem could have been avoided if
Revised § 2-207 began by simply saying, "If a contract is formed under 2-204,
the terms of the contract are ...... Why that was not done remains a mystery,
especially since Comment 2 to Revised § 2-207 indicates that was its intent.97
Revised § 2-207 also allows a subsequent confirmation of a contract to
change the terms of a contract after the contract has already been formed.
Under Revised § 2-207, if a contract formed in any manner is confirmed by a
record that contains terms that are additional to or different from the terms in
the contract being confirmed, the contract terms are the terms that appear in the
record of both parties, terms on which both parties agree (whether in a record
or not), and terms supplied or incorporated under the Code. 98 This provision
potentially allows a party to change a contract unilaterally after it has been
formed by sending a non-conforming "confirmation." For example, suppose the
buyer's purchase order provided that "payment due 90 days," and seller's
acknowledgment also provided that "payment due 90 days." Later, seller sends
a confirmation which states "payment due 60 days for balances over $10,000."
Arguably, this additional term in the confirmation subjects the contract to
Revised § 2-207. Since the buyer did not expressly address balances above
$10,000, but the seller, in his confirmation, did, then this issue would be
resolved by reference to the provisions of the Code. Since the Code does not
allow ninety days for payment,99 the buyer would not be allowed ninety days
for balances over $10,000. Solely by issuing a non-conforming confirmation of
a contract already formed, the seller is able, ex post facto, to unilaterally
modify the contract. Neither the Revised Code nor the comments explain this
gross deviation from general contract law.
Under Revised § 2-207, if a contract has been formed, but the terms of the
parties are different, the terms of the contract are the "terms that appear in the
records of both parties," "the terms, whether in a record or not, to which both
parties agree," and terms supplied under any provision of Article 2.100 The
obvious problem with interpreting and applying this provision is determining
the terms that the parties have agreed to when those terms are in only one
96 UCC § 2-207 cmt. 1 (2003): "This section applies to all contracts for the sale of
goods, and it is not limited only to those contracts where there has been a 'battle of the
forms.'
97 UCC § 2-207 cmt. 2 (2003).
98 UCC § 2-207 (2003).
99 UCC § 2-507(1) (2003) provides: "Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's
duty to accept the goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to the buyer's duty to pay for them."
'0' UCC § 2-207 (2003) (emphasis added).
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party's document, or even worse, are in neither party's document.' 0 1 This
problem did not elude the drafters. Preliminary Comment 3 to Revised § 2-207
observes that "[b]y inviting a court to determine whether a party 'agrees' to the
other party's terms, the text recognizes the enormous variety of circumstances
that may be presented under this section, and the section gives the court greater
discretion to include or exclude certain terms."' 2 By giving courts discretion to
101 See Linda J. Rusch, Is the Saga of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2
Revisions Over? A Brief Look at What NCCUSL Finally Approved, 6 DEL. L. REv. 41, 58
(2003).
102 Preliminary Comment 3 reads in its entirety:
By inviting a court to determine whether a party "agrees" to the other party's
terms, the text recognizes the enormous variety of circumstances that may be
presented under this section, and the section gives the court greater discretion to
include or exclude certain terms than original Section 2-207 did. In many cases,
performance alone should not be construed to be agreement to the terms in
another's record by one that has sent or will send its own record with additional or
different terms. Thus a party that sends a record (however labeled or
characterized, including an offer, counteroffer, acceptance, acknowledgment,
purchase order, confirmation or invoice) with additional or different terms should
not be regarded as having agreed to any of the other party's additional or different
terms by performance. In that case, the terms are determined under paragraph (a)
(terms in both records) and paragraph (c) (supplied or incorporated by this Act).
Concomitantly, performance after an original agreement between the parties
(orally, electronically or otherwise) should not normally be construed to be
agreement to terms in the other's record unless that record is part of the original
agreement.
The result would be different where no agreement precedes the performance
and only one party sends a record. If, for example, a buyer sends a purchase order
and there is no oral or other agreement, and the seller delivers in response to the
purchase order but the seller does not send the seller's own acknowledgment or
acceptance, the seller should normally be treated as having agreed to the terms of
the purchase order.
Of course, an offeree's unqualified response, such as "I accept," to an offer
that contained many terms would show agreement to all of the offer's terms. In
some cases an expression of acceptance accompanied by one or more additional
terms also might demonstrate the offeree's agreement to the terms of the offer. For
example, consider a buyer that sends a purchase order with technical
specifications and a seller that responds with a record stating "Thank you for your
order. We will fill it promptly. Note that we do not make deliveries after 3:00 p.m.
on Fridays." Here a court could find that both parties agreed to the technical
specifications.
In some cases a court might find nonverbal agreement to additional or
different terms that appear in only one record. If, for example, both parties' forms
called for the sale of 700,000 nuts and bolts but the purchase order or another
record of the buyer conditioned the sale on a test of a sample to see if the nuts and
bolts would perform properly, the seller's sending a small sample to the buyer
might be construed to be an agreement to buyer's condition. A court could find
that the contract called for arbitration where both forms provided for arbitration
but each contained immaterially different arbitration provisions. It is possible that
trade practice in a particular trade or course of dealing between contracting parties
might treat the offeree's performance as acceptance of the offeror's terms even
when the offeree sent its own record; conversely trade practice or course of
dealing might bind the offeror to terms in the offeree's form when the expectation
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determine the terms to which a party has agreed that are not contained in his
form, and which terms to include or exclude in a contract, Revised § 2-207 has
substituted inconsistency and unpredictability for the certainty inherent in the
mirror image rule and the ambiguity inherent in the current § 2-207. A court, in
its discretion, would be allowed to decide which terms to include or exclude
from a contract, without regard to the provisions in the Code or the written
terms in a party's form.
C. Analysis of Revision
Revised Article 2 includes a series of improvements over the current
Article 2 by separating contract formation from a determination of the contract
terms, thereby underscoring the fact that those are separate and discreet issues.
Revised Article 2 first asks whether a contract has been formed. If so, it then
asks what are the terms of the contract. The answer to the first question is dealt
with in Revised §§ 2-204 and 2-206. The answer to the second question is dealt
with in Revised § 2-207. Revised § 2-207 arguably is made to apply to all
contracts, however formed.
The revision also eliminates the merchant versus non-merchant distinction
in the battle of the forms. No rationale was advanced in the current § 2-207 for
making that distinction, and it only added confusion to the section.
The "material alteration" language has been removed from the revision,
and with it the concomitant issues of how it is determined. Further, under the
revision, there is no longer any need for courts or commentators to exert any
effort to try to distinguish different terms from additional terms, or to create
disingenuous or incomprehensible arguments as to why different terms should
not be treated the same as additional terms. No distinction is made between
different terms and additional terms.
Further, the terms of a contract are not determined by which party fired the
first shot or the last shot, so neither the offeree nor offeror has an advantage.
The knockout rule is used in all cases to determine the contract terms.'
3
Moreover, since Revised § 2-207 applies to all contracts, no longer would there
be an issue whether it applies to a contract in which there is only one form as
opposed to two forms.
in the trade or in the course of dealing so directs.
In a rare case terms in the records of both parties might not become part of
the contract; that might happen where the parties contemplated agreement to a
single negotiated record, each exchanged similar proposals and commenced
interim performance but never reached a negotiated agreement because of
differences over crucial terms. There is a limitless variety of verbal and nonverbal
behavior that may be claimed to be an agreement to another's record. The section
leaves the interpretation of that behavior to the wise discretion of the courts.
UCC § 2-207 preliminary cmt. 3 (2003), available at http://w3.uchastings.edu/
lefstin_0 1/PDF/Contracts/RevisedUCC.pdf.
103 See John D. Wladis, The Contract Formation Sections of the Proposed Revisions to
U.C.C. Article 2, 54 SMU L. REv. 997, 1010-11 (2001).
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Despite its virtues, Revised Article 2 is not without its problems. For
inexplicable reasons, Revised Article 2 repeats the "expression of acceptance"
language contained in the current § 2-207. There will continue to be, therefore,
issues relating to what constitutes an expression of acceptance, and the standard
to be used in determining whether there is an expression of acceptance.
In addition, despite the drafters' intent as expressed in Comments 1104 and
2,105 the language of Revised § 2-207 does not include all contracts formed
under Revised § 2-204, only those contracts formed by an offer and acceptance
or by conduct. 106 Revised § 2-207 also perpetuates the misapprehension of the
current § 2-207 that a confirmation that is inconsistent with the terms of a
contract is a response to an offer, thereby invoking the knockout doctrine.
Again, a confirmation occurs only after a contract is formed, and should not be
used to change the terms of a pre-existing contract.
Moreover, Revised § 2-207 provides the contract includes "terms supplied
or incorporated under any provision of this Act." Presumably, the intent of the
drafters in adding "supplied" was to resolve the conflict in the current § 2-207
regarding whether course of performance, usage of trade, and course of dealing
supplemented the contract terms. The most unequivocal way to resolve that
conflict, however, would have been to have expressly stated that those
doctrines are part of the contract.
Lastly, Revised § 2-207 provides that the contract terms include those term
to which both parties agree, "whether in a record or not."' 0 7 As a result,
Revised § 2-207 allows a court, in its discretion, to decide which terms to
include or exclude from a contract, without regard to the provisions in the Code
or the written terms in a party's document.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
As has been amply demonstrated, all of the above solutions to the battle of
the forms are so flawed that they defy any effort to produce consistent, just, and
impartial results. The battle of the forms begs for a solution that is simple,
straightforward, fair, sensible, and free of problems in construction,
interpretation, and application. It shouts for a solution that leads to certainty
and predictability, but is not a formulaic process that is rigidly and
mechanically applied. It cries for a solution that is sufficiently flexible to take
into account the parties to the subject transaction and any peculiar
characteristics and circumstances of the transaction.
A. Contract Formation
In resolving the battle of the forms, a contract should be found when the
parties manifest an intent and commitment to be bound. Revised Article 2 took
104 UCC § 2-207 cmt. 1 (2003).
105 UCC § 2-207 cmt. 2 (2003).
106 UCC §§ 2-204, 2-207 (2003).
107 UCC § 2-207 (2003).
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a significant first step when it proposed that § 2-204, the contract formation
section (entitled "Formation in General"), be amended to provide that "[a]
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including offer and acceptance, [and] conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract."' 0 8 This formulation in essence,
rightly finds that a contract has been formed by either words or conduct when
the parties have manifested an intent and commitment to be bound. Revised
§ 2-204 would also amend current Article 2 by removing the contract formation
language that was embedded in § 2-207, thereby making § 2-204 the only
section governing.contract formation. Revised § 2-204 also expressly adds that
a contract may be formed by "offer and acceptance." These proposed changes
were long overdue, and this author enthusiastically -applauds and endorses
them.
That said, where the issue is whether a contract has been formed by an
offer and acceptance, that is, whether the offeree has accepted the offeror's
offer, Revised § 2-206 misses the mark by proposing that current § 2-206,
"Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract," be amended by adding a
subsection (3) which imports the ambiguous and troublesome "expression of
acceptance" language. 10 9 This author proposes that a subsection (3) be added to
§ 2-206, but that it provide as follows: "A seasonable response to an offer
which a reasonable person would understand as an acceptance operates as an
acceptance."
This short and simple sentence, in deleting "expression of acceptance,"
eliminates all ambiguity regarding what constitutes an acceptance. If this
proposal were adopted, there would no longer be a question regarding the
extent to which a non-conforming response can differ from the offer before it is
no longer an "expression of acceptance," but rather a rejection. This proposal
also clears up the standard to be used in determining "acceptance." Under the
proposal, if from the objective prospective of a reasonable person, a non-
conforming response to an offer is understood as an acceptance, it will be
treated as an acceptance. Since the objective reasonable person standard is a
standard that permeates virtually all areas of the law, courts and parties are
already familiar with it, and it requires no novel or abstruse interpretation or
construction. Further, the determination of reasonableness would be a factual
issue, so that it would have the requisite flexibility to accommodate the
circumstances and characteristics peculiar to any transaction. Furthermore, the
harsh rigidity of the mirror image rule is abolished, which unfairly allowed
inconsequential, immaterial differences between the offer and acceptance to
prevent the formation of a contract.' 10 In addition, the reasonable person
108 UCC § 2-204 (2003).
109 UCC § 2-206(3) (2003) ("A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance in a
record operates as an acceptance even if it contains terms additional to or different from the
offer.").
110 Some courts have recognized the unfair rigidity of the mirror image rule and used
fictions to avoid its application, or simply did not apply it if the variance was immaterial.
See, e.g., Propstra v. Dyer, 189 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1951); Newspaper Readers Serv., Inc. v.
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standard is party neutral, so neither the offeree nor the offeror is advantaged or
disadvantaged by its use. Lastly, all references to "additional" or "different"
terms have been excised. Accordingly, the issue is focused solely on the
understanding of a reasonable person, not on "additional" or "different" terms
and the attendant definitional, interpretation, and application problems.
B. Contract Terms
With § 2-204 addressing all issues of contract formation under this
proposal, the author would revise § 2-207 to only address contract terms. The
determination of contract terms, like contract formation, should be simple,
clear, unambiguous, fair, and easy to interpret and apply. It should also
recognize the commercial reality that the boilerplate in standard forms is
customarily not read by the parties, a fact which should not redound to the
benefit or detriment of either party.
Incorporating all of those considerations, this author proposes that § 2-
207111 be amended as follows:
Canonsburg Pottery Co., 146 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1945); Milliken-Tomlinson Co. v. Am. Sugar
Ref. Co., 9 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1925); see also Frederick D. Lipman, On Winning the Battle of
the Forms: An Analysis of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 Bus. LAW.
789, 791-92 (1969); Baird & Weisberg, supra note 24, at 1233-34.
i See UCC § 2-207 (1966):
§ 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which
is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a
reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to
establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms
incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
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Proposed § 2-207 Terms of Contract112
The terms of a contract formed under § 2-204 shall consist of:
Terms that appear in the records of both parties;
Course of Dealing;
Course of Performance;
Usage of trade; and
Terms incorporated under any provisions of this Act.
Unlike current § 2-207, this proposal does not apply the all or nothing
approach of either the first shot rule and the last shot rule in determining the
terms of the contract. It consistently applies the "knockout" rule that neutrally
sets the contract terms so that they do not favor either the offeree or the offeror,
and neither party is stuck with the other party's boilerplate. Neither party
benefits from the battle of the forms or has an incentive to draft one-sided
terms.
This proposal does not differentiate between merchants and non-
merchants. Proposed § 2-207 is applied the same way, no matter who the
parties are. Again, neither party, regardless of its status, has an advantage in
determining the terms of the contract. This makes sense. The terms of a
contract should not be determined by who the parties to the contract are.
Proposed § 2-207 does not refer to "different terms" or "additional
terms"-if, in fact, a true distinction can be made-nor does it refer to material
alterations. The use of such terms is no longer necessary. Pursuant to Proposed
§ 2-207, an acceptance occurs if a reasonable person understands the response
as an acceptance. The focus, therefore, is on whether the response is reasonably
understood as an acceptance even though it is not identical to the offer, not on
whether there are different terms, additional terms, or a material alteration in
the response. Also eliminated in Proposed § 2-207 is the need to figure out
whether a material alteration should be predicated upon a "surprise" or a
"hardship" indicated in Comment 4,113 or "unreasonable surprise" indicated in
112 The hierarchy of UCC §§ 1-205 and 2-208 (1966) is retained. UCC § 1-205(4)
provides:
The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of dealing or usage of trade
shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such
construction is unreasonable express terms control both course of dealing and usage of
trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.
UCC § 2-208(2) provides:
The express terms of the agreement and any such course of performance, as well as any
course of dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed wherever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable, express terms
shall control course of performance and course of performance shall control both course
of dealing and usage of trade.
The "[t]erms that appear in the records of both parties" under this author's proposed § 2-
207(1) are the "express terms of the [an] agreement" referred to above.
113 UCC § 2-207 cmt. 4 (1966).
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Comment 5.1 14 Hence, all of the definitional, interpretation, and application
problems relating to these matters are supplanted by the simple and familiar
factual determination of reasonableness.
Under Proposed § 2-207, where there is a battle of the forms, the knockout
rule is used so that the terms of the contract are the terms that are in both
parties' documents. Those terms are then expressly supplemented by course-of
dealing, course of performance, usage of trade, and the provisions of the Code.
As indicated earlier, unlike the fall out rule, use of the knockout rule is neutral
in that neither party is favored or bound to terms in the other party's boilerplate
(unless the boilerplate is contained in both parties' forms). Moreover, expressly
making course of dealing, 115 course of performance," 6 and trade usage" 7 part
of the contract insures that the intent of the parties will be effectuated.1 8 How
the parties have acted with respect to the subject contract (course of
performance), and in other transactions (course of dealing) is the best and
clearest indication of the intent and agreement of the parties. Further, if there is
a trade usage or custom, there is a presumption that that trade usage or custom
will be observed in the subject transaction.' 19 The Code already provides that
course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage are part of the
contract. 12 However, the express inclusion of these doctrines in Proposed § 2-
207, as well as providing that the Code supplements the contract, is done for
clarity and to preclude the argument made by some that only terms expressly
stated in the Code can supplement the contract.
12 1
VI. CONCLUSION
The battle of the forms that resulted from the exchange of standard form
contracts has gone on for over one hundred years. Yet every attempt to end the
battle has proven only to inflame it. The mirror image rule often ignored the
intent and commitment of the parties to be bound to a contract, and often
rendered intended contracts unenforceable because of immaterial,
inconsequential, and ignored terms. The concomitant last shot rule arbitrarily
favored the party who sent the last form. The promulgation of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code further compounded the problem. The Article 2
resolution to the battle of the forms was internally inconsistent, complex, and
confusing. It used terms that were ambiguous, and imposed standards that were
114 UCC § 2-207 cmt. 5 (1966).
115 See note 82 supra.
116 See note 83 supra.
117 See note 82 supra.
118 If the parties do not intend to be bound by course of dealing, course of performance,
or usage of trade, they may expressly agree otherwise, and their express agreement controls.
See UCC § 2-207 (2003).
119 UCC § 2-207 (2003).
120 See notes 82 and 83 supra. See also UCC § 2-102 (1966), which provides in
pertinent part that "this Article applies to transactions in goods."
121 See C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1977).
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vague and inconsistent. As a result, cases are in disarray, and legal experts
clash over its construction, interpretation, and application. Revised Article 2
also fails to hit the mark. A new approach is needed to resolve the battle of the
forms-an approach that is direct, fair, uncomplicated, flexible, and above all
simple. It is submitted that the author's proposed revisions effectively and
efficiently resolve the battle of the forms, are easy to interpret, will produce
consistently equitable results, and above all, they KEEP IT SIMPLE, STUPID.

